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Abstract
It is a widely accepted fact that state–sponsored Twitter ac-
counts operated during the 2016 US presidential election
spreading millions of tweets with misinformation and inflam-
matory political content. Whether these social media cam-
paigns of the so–called “troll” accounts were able to manipulate
public opinion is still in question. Here we aim to quantify the
influence of troll accounts and the impact they had on Twitter by
analyzing 152.5 million tweets from 9.9 million users, includ-
ing 822 troll accounts. The data collected during the US elec-
tion campaign, contain original troll tweets before they were
deleted by Twitter. From these data, we constructed a very large
interaction graph; a directed graph of 9.3 million nodes and
169.9 million edges. Recently, Twitter released datasets on the
misinformation campaigns of 8,275 state–sponsored accounts
linked to Russia, Iran and Venezuela as part of the investigation
on the foreign interference in the 2016 US election. These data
serve as ground–truth identifier of troll users in our dataset. Us-
ing graph analysis techniques we qualify the diffusion cascades
of web and media context that have been shared by the troll
accounts. We present strong evidence that authentic users were
the source of the viral cascades. Although the trolls were par-
ticipating in the viral cascades, they did not have a leading role
in them and only four troll accounts were truly influential.
1 Introduction
The Russian efforts to interfere in and manipulate the outcome
of the 2016 US presidential election were unprecedented in
terms of the size and scope of the operations. Millions of posts
across multiple social media platforms gave rise to hundreds of
millions of impressions targeting specific segments of the popu-
lation in an effort to mobilize, suppress, or shift votes [9]. Trolls
were particularly focused on the promotion of identity narra-
tives [10], though that does not distinguish them from many
other actors during the election [17]. The Special Counsel’s
report described this interference as ”sweeping and system-
atic” ([15], vol 1, 1). Russia demonstrated an impressive array
of tactics for producing significant damage to the integrity of
the communication spaces where Americans became informed
and discussed their political choices during the election [14].
While Russia’s efforts continue ”unabated” [20], it is likely
they and others will seek to target the American election in
2020 as well as continuing to target elections in Europe and
elsewhere. It is important, therefore to identify the operational
tactics of social media influence operations if we are to promul-
gate adequate defenses against them in the future.
There is a considerable debate as to whether state–sponsored
disinformation campaigns that operated on social media were
able to affect the outcome of the 2016 US Presidential election.
While there is a large body of work which tried to address this
question from distinct disciplinary angles [2, 9, 17] a conclu-
sive result is still missing. There are several obstacles that any
empirical study on this subject has dealt with: (i) the lack of
complete and unbiased Twitter data – the Twitter API returns
only a small sample of the users’ daily activity; (ii) The tweets
from deactivated profiles are not available; (iii) The followers
and followees lists are not always accessible, hence the social
graph is unknown. Moreover, the disinformation strategies that
the operators of the state–sponsored accounts had employed is
also unclear. A naive approach such as the one that flooded the
network with fake–news is not obviously the case. A study of
Russian social media activity has found that the majority of the
communications are not obviously false [16]. It is equally pos-
sible that the operators had performed advanced manipulation
techniques such as first building a reliable social profile aiming
to engage a group of followers and then transmitting factually
correct, but otherwise deceptive and manipulative claims ad-
vancing the political objectives of the disinformation campaign.
Hence, text mining and machine learning techniques might not
perform well under this scenario.
In this paper we measure the impact of troll activities on the
virality of the ambiguous political information that had been
shared on Twitter during the 2016 US Presidential election. For
that purpose, a very large directed graph has been constructed
by the interactions between the users (tweet replies and men-
tions). The graph consists of 9.3 million nodes and 169 million
edges and it has been constructed based on two Twitter datasets:
(i) A collection of 152.5 million tweets that was downloaded
using the Twitter API during the US presidential election period
(from September 21 to November 7, 2016). Hence, we have ac-
cess to original troll tweets that have yet to be deleted by Twit-
ter. (ii) A collection of original troll tweets which have been
released by Twitter itself as part of the investigation on foreign
interference in the 2016 US election – the misinformation cam-
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paigns of 8,275 state–sponsored accounts linked to Russia, Iran
and Venezuela states. Using graph analysis techniques and clas-
sification, we are able to identify the group of users that were
most probably the driving force of the viral cascades that have
been shared by the troll accounts.
Contribution: Our primary contributions are as follows:
• We construct one of the largest graphs in the literature,
which represents the interactions between state–sponsored
troll accounts and authentic users in Twitter during the pe-
riod of 2016 US Presidential election. This is an approxi-
mation of the original followers–followees social graph.
• We present strong evidence that the trolls’ activity was not
the main cause that led to viral cascades of web and media
material in Twitter. The experimental results clearly show
that the authentic users who had close proximity with the
trolls in the graph were the most active and influential part
of the population and their activity was the driving force of
the viral materials. A possible scenario is that instead of in-
jecting new content, these trolls bandwagon or ”resonate”
with communities online with which they sought to form
relationships. They do so, particularly by targeting opin-
ion leaders in these communities. This is consistent with
previous literature on information warfare tactics [4].
2 Related Work
2.1 Diffusion of disinformation
In [19] the authors investigated the diffusion cascades of true
and false rumors distributed on Twitter from 2006 to 2017; ap-
proximately 126,000 rumor cascades which have been spread
by 3 million people. The rumors had been verified as true or
false by six fact–checking organizations. The main funding of
this study is that false news diffused faster and more broadly
than the truth and also human behavior contributes more to the
spread of falsity than the trolls.
[3] examined 171million tweets collected during fivemonths
prior to the 2016 US presidential election. From this collection,
they analyzed 30 million tweets shared by 2.3 million users that
contained at least one web–URL linking to a news outlet web-
site (outside of Twitter). The 25% of these news were either
fake or biased representing the spreading misinformation on
Twitter. Then, in order to investigate the flow of information,
the retweet networks are constructed for each category of news.
Two users i and j are connected by the directed edge (j, i) if
user i retweeted a tweet of user j. Hence, the edges represent
the direction of information flow.
[8] investigated the extent to which Twitter users had been
exposed to fake news during the 2016 US presidential election.
The findings suggest that only a small fraction of 1% of the
population was responsible for the diffusion of 80% of the fake
news. Moreover, they proposed policies which had they been
adopted by the social media platforms they would have reduced
the spread of disinformation.
In [21, 22] the authors analyzed the characteristics and strate-
gies of 5.5K Russian and Iranian troll accounts in Twitter and
Reddit. Moreover, using the Hawkes Process they compute an
overall statistical measure of influence that quantifies the effect
these accounts had on social media platforms, such as Twitter,
Reddit, 4chan and Gab.
[1] examined the Russian disinformation campaigns in the
2016 US election on Twitter. The study is based on 43 million
posts shared on Twitter by 5.7 million distinct users (September
16 to November 9, 2016). The study focuses on the character-
istics of the spreaders, namely the users that had been exposed
and shared content produced by Russian trolls. They showed
that existing techniques such as the Botometer [5] are able to
effectively identify troll accounts.
An analysis of the role of Russian trolls on Twitter during
the 2016 US election is presented in [11]. The time-sensitive se-
mantic edit distance (a text distance metric) is proposed for the
visualization and qualitative analysis of trolls’ strategies such
as left–leaning and right–leaning.
2.2 Identifying malicious activity
A well-known method for identifying troll accounts on Twit-
ter is the Botometer (a.k.a. BotOrNot) introduced by [5].
The Botometer is a publicly available platform for estimating
whether existing Twitter accounts have the characteristics of
social bots. Finally, in [18] the Rumor Gauge is proposed; a
method for predicting the veracity of rumors in Twitter during
real–world events. It is a system for automatic verification of ru-
mors in real–time, before verification by trusted channels such
as governmental organizations is performed.
3 Datasets
3.1 Ground–truth Twitter data
Twitter has recently released a large collection of tweets of
the state–sponsored troll accounts as part of Twitter’s election
integrity efforts1. We requested the unhashed version which
consists of the tweets of Twitter accounts identified as Russian,
Iranian and Venezuelan – 25 million tweets shared by 8,275
troll accounts (see Table 1). These troll IDs served as ground–
truth identifiers of the troll users in our tweets collection.
Table 1: Ground–truth data
Source: 8,275 troll accounts Target
Total tweets: 25,076,853 trolls real users
Replies 1,549,742 2352 410,779
Retweets 8,617,208 3159 531,374
Mentions 10,641,427 2885 1,661,716
We observe that the majority of trolls’ actions were retweets
and mentions. Moreover, the target users were mostly real
users, namely, Twitter accounts that were not in the ground
truth troll IDs list. As we describe in the next section, we see
the tweet–replies and tweet–mentions as actions, i.e. they rep-
resent the interactions from the users who performed these ac-
tions to the users who received them. For instance, when a user
1https://about.twitter.com/en us/values/elections- integrity.html
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i replies to a tweet of user j then the source is i while the target
is j. Hence, in Table 1 with the term source we are referring to
the 8,275 troll users.
3.2 Our Twitter dataset
The analysis in this paper is based on 152.5 million tweets
from 9.9 million users. The tweets were downloaded using
the Twitter streaming (1%) API in the period before and up
to the 2016 US presidential election – from September 21 to
November 7, 2016 (47 days). The tweets’ track terms were re-
lated to political content such as “hillary2016”, “clinton2016”,
“paul2016”, “trump2016” and “donaldtrump2016”(see Ap-
pendix, Table 5 for the complete list of the track terms).
Namely, a list of phrases used to determine which Tweets are
delivered by the stream (see 2 for more details). These were
collected using a Python script utilizing the Tweepy module. In
addition to the tweet text, user screen name, and user ID, we
also collected metadata including the hashtags and expanded
URL data from Twitter, information on the account creation,
user timezone, and user-supplied location and biographic infor-
mation.
Table 2: The tweets collection
real-users trolls
user-IDs 9,939,698 822
Total tweets 152,479,440 35,489
Replies 12,942,628 160
Mentions 172,145,775 33,627
Retweets N/A N/A
Using the troll ground–truth IDs we identified 35.5K tweets
from 822 troll accounts (see Table 2).
4 Methodology
4.1 The graph of interactions
In this paper, we followed a graph theoretical approach,
namely we map users to nodes and we map the interactions
between users to edges. We construct the graph based on the
tweets collection we presented in the previous section – 152.5
million tweets collected during 47 days. The actions between
the users are either replies or mentions (we had not collected
the retweets). Each directed edge (i, j) corresponds to a tweet–
action from user i to user j; either user i had replied to a tweet
of user j or he had mentioned user j in his tweet, or both. So,
we distinguish between replies and mentions. Both are actions
from one user to another. Hence, we have the graph of users’
interactions which is a directed multigraph (i.e., multiple edges
are permitted between any pair of nodes) consisting of:
• nodes: (i) 821 trolls; (ii) 9,321,061 real users.
• edges: 169,921,921.
2https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/guides/basic-
stream-parameters.html
• 31,660 edges: from 659 trolls to 9,371 real users.
• 670,605 edges: from 121,924 real users to 285 trolls.
• ego–net nodes: 127,192 real users (based on both the in–
edges and out–edges with the trolls)
4.2 The region of influence
The main goal of this study is to quantify the influence trolls
had over real (authentic) users. A challenge we have to tackle is
that only few trolls appear in our dataset and the actions/edges
from trolls to real users are small in size. Moreover, we have
121,924 real-users which have at least one action with trolls
(670,605 total actions). These users have either replied to troll
tweets or they have mentioned a troll ID in their tweets. These
real users are the troll ego-nets, namely the trolls’ nearest neigh-
bors – one–hop distance from the trolls in the multigraph. Yet,
this number is not considerably large compared to the millions
of total actions. Therefore, we have to expand the possible re-
gion of users by identifying a population that might have been
influenced by troll activities. In order to achieve that, we use
the web–URLs and media–URLs that have been shared by the
trolls as an identifier of troll influence anywhere in the graph.
Specifically, we collect the expanded URL, media expanded
URL and media URL https from all tweets. Then, we concen-
trate our attention to the URLs that have been shared by at least
one troll user. For the rest of the paper we call this set troll–
URLs. By that, we do not imply that these web contexts nec-
essarily belong to trolls. They are just identifiers of the trolls’
strategies, materials that the trolls wish to be viral. In other
words, even if they are authentic web materials, they still re-
flect the political and strategic objectives of the trolls’ disinfor-
mation campaigns.
We have 5,876,674 tweets from 620 trolls and 1,213,037 real
users. These tweets contain: (i) 16,261 expanded URLs; (ii)
7,266 media expanded URLs; (iii) 7,259 media URL https.
We have three groups of users that shared troll-URLs: (i) the
trolls; (ii) the real users that are part of the trolls’ ego–nets; and
(iii) the real users that are not directly connected with any of
the trolls users. For the rest of the paper, we call all these users
spreaders.
Then, we construct the directed induced subgraph based on
this set of users, namely we select only the edges between the
users that appear in the directed simple graph version of the
multigraph. This subgraph represents the region of influence
between trolls and real users, namely the largest region in the
graph where the influence between trolls and real users could
have taken place. In summary, we have: (i) nodes: 1,145,363;
(ii) edges: 46,429,227; (iii) 560 trolls; (iv) 105,755 ego–net
users; (v) 1,039,552 other users.
Hence, our goal is to compare the impact of these groups in
the diffusion cascades of the trolls–URLs; the media and web
context, which, as we mentioned previously, are a representa-
tion of the trolls disinformation objectives. The rationale of this
approach is that if the trolls were the important factor in these
diffusion cascades then their role during the 2016 US presiden-
tial election was substantial. Otherwise, the real users where
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Figure 1:Multigraph & simple graph: CCDF of the in–degree for spreaders and non–spreaders.
responsible for the virality (if there was any) of the trolls’ ma-
terials.
4.3 Diffusion Cascades
In order to compare the influence of trolls with that of real
users, we have to reconstruct the path of information flow.
Hence, for each troll–URL we construct the time–inferred dif-
fusion cascades in a manner based on a causality assumption
that has been previously used in the literature [6, 18, 19].
4.3.1 Causality hypothesis
We construct the time–inferred diffusion cascades for every
troll–URL as follows:
Suppose that the URL x has been shared by user i on date ti.
First, we select the users with whom i was connected with in
the graph before the date ti, i.e., there were graph edges from i
to them. In other words, we select the ego–net of i for t < ti.
If this set is not empty, then we examine whether any of these
users had also shared the URL x on a date t < ti. Suppose that
two users j and k had shared URL x on dates tk < tj . Then,
we assume that user i had been influenced by user j on adopting
and diffusing the URL x and we update the cascade tree with
the edge (j, i).
This approach has been previously used in the litera-
ture mainly for constructing retweet cascade trees based on
followers–followees original graph. Since a user can retweet
a tweet only once, there is no repetition in the user actions and
the size of a cascade corresponds to the number of unique users
involved in that cascade. In our case this is not true. The user
actions may correspond to several tweets, hence repetitions are
possible. In order to deal with this case, we assume that for a
given URL, every user can be influenced only once by another
user, the first time that he shared it.
4.4 Classification of users
We collect all the URLs and media URLs (the “troll–URLs”)
that were included in trolls tweets. Then, in our tweets collec-
tion, we identify all the tweets that have at least one troll–URL
and have been shared either by trolls or by real users. So, our
goal here is to compute a similarity measure between the troll
accounts and the real users based on the context of their tweets.
In this way, we extend the graph analysis in order to further
characterize the interactions between the two groups of users,
as well as the source of the viral cascades. For instance, if the
very active and influential real users have high similarity with
the trolls, then it is possible that these users were also trolls. To
this end, we take the following steps:
1. We extract the textual data and train a Doc2Vec [13]
model.
2. For each tweet, we get a fix-length vector to represent its
content.
3. For each user, we generate a sequence with time informa-
tion and textual information.
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Figure 2:Multigraph & simple graph: CCDF of the out–degree for spreaders and non–spreaders.
4. We feed sequences of users to a Bi-LSTM [7] model to
classify them into different categories (3 categories in our
setting: 1. Trolls; 2. The real-users that are connected with
the trolls in the action graph; and 3. The rest of the real-
users).
5. Due to the imbalance of size among the three groups, we
randomly select 620 users from each group to form our
dataset. 2/3 of them are used for training and the rest are
used for testing.
Table 3: The classifier
class precision recall f1-score support
trolls (620) 0.8009 0.8204 0.8106 206
ego–net (105,755) 0.9259 0.6039 0.7310 207
others (1,107,282) 0.6533 0.8647 0.7443 207
micro avg 0.7629 0.7629 0.7629 620
macro avg 0.7934 0.7630 0.7619 620
weighted avg 0.7934 0.7629 0.7619 620
Table 3 shows the performance of our classifier. We can see
that the F1-score of trolls detection reaches 0.8106 with both
precision and recall higher than 0.8. This illustrates the useful-
ness of our classifier.
5 Results
The analysis is based on the comparison of the influence of
three groups of users: (i) the trolls; (ii) the real-users that are
directly connected with the trolls (the trolls’ ego–net); (iii) the
rest of the real users. As aforementioned, in order to identify
a broad region of users that might have been influenced by the
trolls, we use the web and media URLs as identifiers of trolls
influence. We call spreaders the users that had shared at least
one troll–URL. Hence, the three groups of users can be further
divided in spreaders and non–spreaders.
The analysis we present in this section consists of the follow-
ing steps:
1. We compute the degree distribution in the overall directed
multigraph as well as in the corresponding directed simple
graph (where only one edge is allowed between each pair
of nodes).
2. We analyze the undirected version of the simple graph and
we identify its connected components.Moreover, we com-
pute the k-core values for the nodes in the largest con-
nected component. We repeat this analysis for the region
of influence.
3. We compute the classification scores of the users in the
region of influence. Based on these scores, we estimate
the similarity between trolls and real users.
4. We analyse the characteristics of the time inferred diffu-
sion cascades of the trolls–URLs and we compute their
5
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5.1 Graph topology
5.1.1 Degree distribution
In Figures 1 and 2 we present the empirical complementary cu-
mulative distribution (CCDF) of the in–degree and out–degree
for each node/user in the directed multigraph as well as in the
directed simple graph. We construct the simple graph by allow-
ing only one edge for each pair of nodes that is already con-
nected in the multigraph. Moreover, the multigraph has been
constructed based on the users’ actions (replies and mentions)
on other Twitter accounts and posts. Hence, the in–degree rep-
resents the nodes’ popularity; that is, how many actions corre-
spond to users interested in their tweets or their Twitter account
in general. On the other hand, the out–degree is a measure of
users’ sociability/extroversion, i.e. how many actions a given
user has performed on other Twitter accounts. Furthermore, it
is important to compare the degree distributions in both graphs
(multigraph and simple graph) because users with high degree
in the multigraph do not necessarily have large degree in the
simple graph. For instance, a given user might have a large in–
degree in the multigraph only because he is popular to a small
group of people which is highly engaged with his Twitter ac-
count – they perform a large number of actions on the tweets of
the user in question. Hence, the user will have small in–degree
in the simple graph.
As mentioned earlier, the real users can be divided in four
groups based on the graph proximity they have with the trolls
and the material they have shared. Hence, we have the ego–
net and the rest of the users as well as the spreaders and non–
spreaders. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the spreaders
that belong to the trolls’ ego–net are the most active and the
most popular ones. Moreover, the degree distributions between
multigraph and simple graph are almost identical for the four
groups of users.
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5.1.2 Connected components
Here we examine the structure of the undirected version of the
simple graph by computing the connected components. A con-
nected component is a subgraph where for each pair of nodes
i, j there is an undirected path – a graph traverse – from i to
j. Since the subject of this study is the diffusion of informa-
tion, the connectivity of a region implies that there is a possible
path for information flow between the nodes that belong to this
region.
The undirected simple graph consists of 9,321,882 nodes and
82,842,096 edges. We identify 104,954 connected components.
Figure 3(a) presents the number of connected components for a
given component size (i.e. number of nodes in the component)
in a log–log plot. The largest part of the graph is well connected.
The largest connected component – undirected subgraph – con-
sists of 9,078,493 nodes and 82,698,678 edges while the second
one has only 223 nodes. Moreover, 815 trolls and 127,183 ego–
net users are in the largest connected component.
Regarding the region of influence, its undirected version con-
sists of 388 connected components. The largest connected com-
ponent has 1,144,526 nodes while the second largest has only 8
nodes (see Figure 3(b)).
5.1.3 k–core decomposition
We compute the k–core decomposition of the nodes in the
largest connected component of the undirected versions of the
overall graph and the region of influence. The k–core values is
one of the most effective centrality measures for identifying the
influential spreaders in a complex network [12].
In Figures 4(a) and 4(b), we present the empirical comple-
mentary cumulative distribution (CCDF) of the k–core val-
ues for spreaders and non–spreaders, respectively. The ego–net
users have the largest k–core values in general, a strong evi-
dence that they were the most influential part of the popula-
tion. Moreover, Figure 5 presents the k-core values of the nodes
in the largest connected component of the region of influence.
Again, the ego–net users have in general larger k-core values
than the trolls.
5.2 Cascade trees
We now turn our attention to the diffusion cascades of the
troll–URLs. First, in Figure 6(a) we present a general result,
the relative first–appearance of trolls and the ego–net users.
For each URL, we rank the user IDs in descending order based
on the date that they post their first tweet which contain the
URL in question. This list is in fact the history of the diffusion
of a given URL – a series of consecutive instances of sharing a
given URL through tweeting. It is just the list of user IDs that
7
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Figure 7: Influence: (a) Number of trolls with a given influence–degree value (for the troll users with with influence–degree > 0) ; (b) CCDF
of the influence–degree for the ego–net users with non–zero influence values; (c) CCDF of the classification scores for the ego–net users with
influence–degree > 100; (d) Scatter plot of the classification scores and the influence–degree for the ego–net users with influence–degree > 100.
0 5 10 15 20 25
Structural virality
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CC
DF
original
trolls removed
Figure 8: The structural virality of the original cascade trees as well
as the cascade trees when the trolls have been removed from the multi-
graph graph.
shared the URL, in chronological order. Recall that in our data,
any URL might have been shared multiple times by the same
user. The size of a given URL–diffusion is simply the number
of user IDs belonging in the list (including the repetitions of
IDs). In other words, the relative first–appearance of a user in
the URL–diffusion is the index of the user in the list divided
by the length of this list. In Figure 6(a), we show the empirical
cumulative distribution (CDF) for the relative position of trolls
and ego–net spreaders. Clearly, the largest part of the ego–net
users appear before the trolls in the diffusion–lists. Almost 85%
of the ego–net users appear first in the URL–diffusions.
Next, we examine the URLs that have been shared by more
than 100 distinct users. This selection led to 5,092 URL–
diffusions. Then, based on the method we described in the pre-
vious section, we construct the cascade trees for each URL–
diffusion. In this way, we obtain 88,714 cascade trees for 5,084
URLs that have at least one non–empty cascade tree. In sum-
mary: (i) 4,125 cascades have at least one troll user and all of
them have at least one ego–net user; (ii) 64,525 cascades have
at least one ego–net user and zero troll users. In the cascade
trees each user appears only once, hence the size of a cascade
is equal to the number of distinct IDs belonging in the tree.
In Figure 6(b), we present the empirical complementary cumu-
lative distribution (CCDF) of the relative first–appearance of
trolls and the ego–net users in the cascade trees. We observe
that 80% of the ego–net users appear very early in the cascades.
The most viral cascades are those with both trolls and ego–
net users (see Figure 6(c)). At the same time, only 647 cascades
had been initiated by troll users versus 54,111 by ego–net users.
Roughly, 10% of the cascades that had been initiated by trolls
have a larger size, yet the truly viral cascades had been initiated
mainly by the ego–net users (Figure 6(d)). This evidence that
although the trolls participated in the viral cascades, they did
not have a leading role in them. Instead, the primary source of
the viral cascades was the real users.
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5.2.1 Influence
Did the trolls have an influential role in the diffusion cas-
cades? We address this question by computing for each user
i the influence–degree, namely the number of real users that
have been influenced by i in the cascade trees he participates.
Only 31 trolls have non–zero influence–degree. From them,
6 trolls have influence–degrees 978, 998, 2,961, 6,636, 9,040,
and 46,224, respectively (Figure 7(a)). Hence, only four trolls
where truly influential. Regarding the ego–net users: 37,535
have non–zero influence; 3,453 users, 511 users and 34 users
have influence–degree larger than 102, 103 and 104, respec-
tively (Figure 7(b)).
How similar with the troll accounts were the ego–net users?
In order to estimate this, we use the classifications scores of the
troll–category for the ego–net users with influence–degree >
100. We have 3,453 ego–net users with influence–degree >
100, where 21 users were in the training set and 3,432 in the
test set. Hence, we present the classification scores for the
3,432 users, only. The 80% of the users have classification
score smaller than 0.6 (see Figure 7(c)). Moreover, in Fig-
ure 7(d) we show the scatter plot of the classification scores
and the influence-degree for the ego–net real users with influ-
ence larger than 100. The classification scores – the similarity
of the real users with the trolls in terms of tweets content –
represent the independent variable while the influence–degree
the dependent one. The most influential users have low clas-
sification scores. Furthermore, the Pearson and Spearman cor-
relation coefficients are (r = −0.031, p-value = 0.067) and
(rs = 0.021, p-value = 0.21), respectively. Hence, there is
neither a linear nor a monotonic relationship between the two
variables.
5.2.2 Structural virality
We conclude the analysis with the computation of the struc-
tural virality for each cascade tree. The structural virality of a
cascade tree T with n > 1 nodes is the average distance be-
tween all pairs of nodes in a cascade [6]. That is:
ν(T ) =
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
dij (1)
where T is the cascade tree with n nodes and dij is the shortest
path between the nodes i and j. The intuition is that ν(T ) is the
average depth of nodes when we consider all nodes as the root
of the cascade.
We compute the structural virality for the 88,714 cascade
trees of 5,084 URLs that were discussed previously. We ex-
amined two cases: (i) the original cascades (88,714); (ii) the
cascade trees that we have reconstructed for the case where
the trolls have been removed from both the graph and the
5,084 URL–diffusions. The exclusion of the trolls results in
95,539 cascade trees. This indicates that a portion of the orig-
inal trees broke in smaller trees, and probably some trolls act
as “bridges”. That is, they connect paths of the overall diffu-
sion flow. On the other hand, it seems that their role was not
substantial. The exclusion of the trolls did not affect the distri-
bution of the virality values (see Figure 8).
5.3 Summary of the results
For all the metrics we have applied, the trolls as a whole have
an inferior role compared to the ego–net users. The ego–net
users, namely the real users that had at least one interactionwith
the trolls, were the most influential population and the source
of the viral cascades, as well. Table 4 provides the specifics.
Table 4: Top–k results: trolls vs ego–net spreaders
Metrics trolls ego–net
Popularity: in–degree > 103 12 5,223
Sociability: out–degree > 103 3 21,887
Nodes in the largest k-core 7 3,552
Source node (“patient–zero”):
Number of cascades 647 54,111
Source node: number of cascades
with cascade size > 103 12 725
influence–degree> 103 4 511
Furthermore, we have derived the following statistics:
1. Only 12 trolls but 5,223 ego–net users have in–degree
larger than 103 (multigraph).
2. Only 3 trolls but 21,887 ego–net users have out–degree
larger than 103 (multigraph).
3. Only 7 trolls but 3,552 ego–net users belong to the largest
k-core region of the graph (max k-core value = 854).
4. Only 647 cascades had been initiated by trolls but 54,111
by ego–net users.
5. Only 12 viral cascades (size larger than 103) had been ini-
tiated by trolls but 725 by ego–net users.
6. Only 4 trolls had influence–degree larger than 103 but 511
for the ego–net users.
7. The most influential ego–net users have low similarity
with the trolls.
Finally, although the trolls participated in viral cascades,
their role was not substantial. Removing the trolls from the
graph as well as from the URL–diffusions did not affect the
distribution of the structural virality values.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have extensively studied the influence that
state–sponsored troll Twitter accounts had during the 2016 US
presidential election. We analyzed a very large graph which
represents the interactions between trolls and real users and we
concentrated our attention to the region of influence, namely
the well-connected part of the graph where trolls could have in-
fluenced real users. We present strong evidence that the trolls’
activity was not the source of the viral cascades. The authentic
users who had close proximity with the trolls were the most in-
fluential part of the population and their activity was the driving
force of the viral cascades.
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8 Appendix
Table 5 presents the 77 track terms used in Twitter API.
Table 5: The track terms used in Twitter API
ben%20carson bencarson
bernie%20sanders bernie2016
bettercandidatethanhillary carlyfiorina2016
carson2016 clinton
clinton2016 cruz2016
cruzcrew cruzintocaucus
donaldtrump donaldtrump2016
dumptrump election2016
feelthebern fiorina
fiorina2016 fitn
heswithher hilaryclinton
hillary2016 hillaryclinton
hrc huckabee
huckabee2016 imwithher
iwearebernie jill%20stein
jillstein johnkasich
kasich kasich2016
kasich4us letsmakeamericagreatagain
makeamericagreatagain makeamericawhiteagain
marco%20rubio marcorubio
martinomally mikehuckabee
nevertrump newyorkvalues
nhpolitics nhpsc
omalley paul2016
primaryday randpaul2016
readldonaldtrump realdonaldtrump
redstate rick%20santorum
ricksantorum rubio2016
rubiowa sensanders
sentedcruz stein2016
teamKasich teamcarly
teamclinton teamcruz
teamhillary teammarco
teamrubio teamtrump
ted%20cruz tedcruz
the%20donald thedonald
therealdonaldtrump trump
trump2016 trumptrain
unitedblue
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